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WRITING AND READING IN
PHILOSOPHY, LAW, AND
POETRY
James Boyd White

Introduction

In this paper I will treat a very general question, the nature of
writing and what can be achieved by it, pursuing it in the three
distinct contexts provided by philosophy, law, and poetry.
My starting-point will be Plato's Phaedrus, where, in a wellknown passage, Socrates attacks writing itself: he says that true
philosophy requires the living engagement of mind with mind of a
kind that writing cannot attain. Yet this is obviously a paradox, for
Socrates' position is articulated and recorded by Plato in writing.
How then can we make sense of what Plato is saying and doing?
What kind of writing, for example, does he think he is himself
engaged in? What, according to him, is good philosophical writing
more generally, if such a thing exists? This will be my first question.
Next I shall turn to the law, where it seems that writing is both
utterly necessary and, as we shall see, often hopeless as a guide to
the decision of actual cases. I shall look in particular at the first
amendment to the Constitution of the United States and a case
arising under it, asking what we can hope writing can achieve in
this context. What is good legal writing, if such a thing exists, and
what can be attained by it? Finally, I shall turn to poetry, using a
poem by William Carlos Williams as my example, to define more
fully the conception of writing, and of writing well, towards
which I am working, in the hopes that we can then carry it back
to what we have already done in philosophy and law. In all of this
I shall be trying to give content to a rather simple and traditional
idea-that reading and writing can be seen as forms of conversation-by working it out in three rather different situations.
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Philosophy

First, then, Plato's Phaedrus. Towards the end of this dialogue the
conversation turns from the nature of the soul and of love, its
ostensible subjects, to the rather more mundane subject of writing.
In this connection Socrates tells a story, supposedly from Egypt,
which runs roughly this way:
The god Theuth, the inventor of astronomy and geometry and
arithmetic and other sciences, comes to Thamus, the king of
Egypt, to offer him his various inventions. He presents them to
the king, one by one; Thamus, a kind of technological sceptic,
examines each, asking what it is good for and what dangers it
presents, before deciding whether to accept it. The conversation
is intense and extended, as the merits of each invention are
discussed in detail. The god Theuth is perhaps a bit deflated by
Thamus' critical responses, but when he comes to the gift of writing his spirits are restored: he expresses the greatest confidence
that this is a great invention, one that will surely make the
Egyptians happy, for it will improve their memories. In writing he
has found, he says, a magic charm for wisdom and memory. But
Thamus disputes this claim, claiming that writing will in fact
have the opposite effect from that predicted: since people will rely
upon writing rather than their memories it will stimulate forgetfulness, not memory; and since they will be calling upon something external to themselves, not what is in their minds, it will
create the false appearance, not the reality, of knowledge and
wisdom.
Socrates then goes on to say, in his own voice, that writing is to
speaking as a painting is to a person: it creates the image of meaning, but is wholly unable to answer when questioned. The written
text just keeps repeating the same thing over and over, unable to
adjust or respond to questions, doubts, or new ideas. For this
reason, he says, we should take rather little satisfaction in what
we write, even the best things we can do. This sceptical view of
the value of writing is reaffirmed in Plato's seventh letter where he
says that his philosophy is not to be found in any of his writings,
but exists only in the living engagement of the mind. 1 Writing is at
best a kind of play or game; the real thing, that about which we
1

P_lato, Seventh Letter, 341C-D, 344C.
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should really be concerned, lies elsewhere, in actual conversation
between minds taking place in what we might call 'real time'.
As I said above, there is an obvious paradox here, for both of
the Platonic strictures against writing take place in writing.
Without writing, indeed, we should have virtually no access to
Plato's mind, or the mind of Socrates either for that matter, nor
any sense of what Plato meant when he said that philosophy lay
not in writing but in conversation. In fact, our best examples of
the kind of living interaction between mind and mind that he
admires are themselves in writing, as in this very dialogue. It is
impossible to believe that Plato, one of the world's best writers,
did not value highly his achievement of this kind.
What sense, then, can we make of Plato's attack on writing? To
pursue this question will perhaps help us think about the merits
and demerits of writing in our own world, and about the kind of
education that will enable us to write well, and read well, including in the law.
READING THE PHAEDRUS

A natural place to begin is with our experience of reading the
writing that is the text of the Phaedrus. The first thing that is
likely to leap out at the reader is that this text, like so many other
of the Platonic dialogues, is neither an argument written to
support a particular set of propositions, nor a disquisition upon a
particular subject. Rather, it is a story; a drama; a conversation; a
dialogue, beginning with the meeting of Socrates and Phaedrus
outside the walls of Athens and ending with their going back into
the city together. Something happens between those two points;
the creation of that happening between the speakers, and the
corresponding happening in the life of the reader, is certainly one
aim, perhaps the true aim, of the text.
I will not try to summarize the whole thing, but it may help if I
say this much about what happens: Phaedrus and Socrates meet
outside the city walls; Phaedrus talks about a party he has just
recently left, at which the orator Lysias read a very clever speech;
Phaedrus has borrowed a copy of this speech, which he has been
planning to commit to memory; now seeking a place to discuss the
speech, Socrates and Phaedrus find the cool and shaded atmosphere
of the river-trees, commenting in detail on their surroundings.
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Phaedrus then reads aloud the speech of Lysias, in which a seducer
paradoxically argues that the fact that he is not in love is a good
reason for his target to yield to his desires; Socrates, spurred on by
Phaedrus, gives, in a kind of competition, a speech of his own to
the same end, his point being that love is a kind of irrationality
and thus inconsistent with the philosophic life. Suddenly visited by
his private divine force, however, Socrates realizes that what he
has said is awful, for love is a god and must be good; he then
delivers a second speech, this one in favour of love, in which
among other things he works out the famous image of the human
soul as a pair of winged horses, one good, one bad, managed by a
charioteer. Human souls once lived in the heavens, he says, but
through mismanagement have lost their wings and fallen into an
earthly life. Love, Socrates says, is an experience that reminds the
soul of what it once had, life in contact with beauty and truth, and
it rekindles the desire to attain it. It is one of the greatest gifts of
life. When Socrates has finished, he and Phaedrus then speak
about various questions raised by the three speeches on love,
including the issue whether writing is a good or bad thing.
Even this summary should be enough to show that this
dialogue is not, as I say, a sustained conceptual argument, leading
by logical progression from one point to another, but a composition far more complex, in which one part answers or responds to
another. Its closest analogue may be a play by Shakespeare, where
any position Shakespeare has is expressed not by this speech or
that, but by the play as a whole, by the way voice answers voice.
For Shakespeare's art lies not only in the composition of the
speeches but their arrangement: it is here, in the relation of these
gestures across time, that Shakespeare can be found. And in
Shakespeare as in Plato one finds items of very different kinds,
humorous and solemn and farcical and deeply felt.
For the reader of both authors, then, the question is not so much
what this all 'means' in a propositional way-as if true understanding meant the capacity to utter a series of true statements that
represented what Plato or Shakespeare would have said if they had
been smart enough-but what it means in an entirely different
way, as an experience of mind and imagination, of thought and
feeling. Its end is not persuasion to a set of statements, but something vastly more important and profound, a transformation of the
mind and motives and understandings of the reader.
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Reading the Phaedrus thus requires one constantly to ask
exactly how a particular passage is to be taken in light of other
passages or other moments. Here the question of tone is crucial.
For example, in the central myth about the soul as a pair of
winged horses guided by a charioteer, part of the story is that once
the soul has fallen from the heavens to the earth, the experience of
physical desire for a beautiful body reminds the soul of its own
earlier experience of beauty itself, in the heavens, where the
Eternal Forms can be directly apprehended; the person thus
touched by eras starts to feel the itch and pain of his feathers
beginning to sprout, in the total intoxication of desire. How are
we to read this? I can remember being told that this story was a
perfectly serious allegory of the moral nature of the soul, and that
the lesson was plain, to develop the rational faculties of the charioteer to control one's baser impulses. But this won't work at all: it
is some of the so-called baser impulses that are celebrated here,
and the kind of madness they bring about is far from rational
control. And in any event such a lead-footed reading is totally
dead to what is most wonderful about this myth: its invented,
playful quality, comic even to the point of the self-consciously
ludicrous, poised as it is against a kind of real seriousness. The
speech is both serious and comic, both beautiful and silly, both to
be believed and to be disbelieved.
The story about Theuth and Thamus has similar qualities. It is
funny, to start with, as the resolutely practical Thamus examines
the gifts of the god with a sceptical air and practical intelligence.2
(I do not think it wholly accidental that their names, at least for
me, work as a kind of tongue-twister, leading me to want to lisp
the second name, thus, 'Thamuth'.) And, as I suggested before, the
apparent message of the story, that writing is bad because it will
destroy memory and wisdom, is in plain contradiction to certain
of the premises of the text of which it is a part. How then are we
to read it?
One possibility-and it is only one-is to start from Socrates'
point that the trouble with writing is that it always says the same
thing and can thus never respond to questions or criticisms, never
2 This is just what Socrates does not do with the gift of sexual desire, from
Eros, and Thamus thus stands as a mild reproach to Socrates' abandonment of
reason in telling the central myth.
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engage in the conversational process that is the centre of philosophy. Plato is perhaps here telling us why he writes in the form of
the dialogue, rather than simply telling us 'what he thinks and
why he thinks it'-as though such a thing could be done.
On this view, what the passage about writing suggests is that he,
Plato, is trying to write a text that is different from the kind of writing he rejects and instead has some of the essential qualities of
conversation. It does not simply say something, and stop; rather, it
offers the reader a complex experience, in part consisting of the
stimulation of questions-about the myth of horses for example, or
this very passage about reading-that the text will not in any obvious or easy way answer, but with respect to which it affords the
reader material for thought, if he can grasp and manage it. Here, for
example, the question, 'What can Plato mean by these strictures
against writing?' leads to the possibility that it is not all writing that
he opposes, but writing of a certain kind-or reading of a certain
kind-working on certain premises. Moreover, in the way in which
Plato renders living conversation between Socrates and Phaedrus
one can find some idea of what his own aim is as a writer, and the
standards by which he wants his writing to be judged.
I do not want to suggest that this is where the process stops:
there are other points about writing, other complications and
mysteries here, but this in a sense is the main point: Plato has written a text that does not simply say the same thing always, but says
different things as you bring different questions to it. Its aim is to
offer its reader a disorienting experience of controlled uncertainty
and thus to stimulate independence of mind, in the way that
conversation, or dialectic, at its best can do. On this view philosophy is not the exposition of a certain set of propositions about
the world, but a mode of life and thought; its end is not a set of
statements, but an end of a different kind, the transformation of
the mind and imagination of the reader. This is a process that by
its nature has no termination until death, and the hoped-for return
to the world in which truth and beauty and goodness can be seen
simply and clearly for what they are.
THE LIMITS OF LANGUAGE

One reason why Plato wrote this way, rather than proceeding as
Euclid was to do in another field, from first principles, or as
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Aristotle did, from common knowledge, is that for Plato the
language in which he thought and wrote was a large part of the
problem he addressed. This was partly a matter of its particular
substantive commitments, for example to an idea of justice and
'goodness' that consisted in large part of the power to exercise
dominion over others, 3 but partly also a matter of the nature of
human language more generally-for there is no language in
which the truth can simply be said, and in Plato's view we must
train ourselves to accept that fact and to display our awareness of
it in our speaking and our writing alike.
The point of Plato's doctrine of the Eternal Forms, then, is not
to assert the truth of their existence, which can after all never be
observed or known while we live, but to define, by their absence,
what human life lacks. This is a way of drawing attention to the
important fact of actual human life that such knowledge is denied
us. We must live on conditions of radical uncertainty; and it is to
show us how this might be done without collapsing into incoherence or despair that the dialogue exists.
The experience of reading Plato may in fact provide us with a
method for the reading of philosophy more generally, for it
suggests among other things that the language in which philosophy
is carried on can, and perhaps should always, be part of its subject.
If we start to yield to the desire to create a general philosophic
system, as Plato himself often did, the experience of the Phaedrus
should check us in that course; not to prevent us, necessarily, but
to slow us down. If, for example, we find ourselves talking about
the 'proper end of life', and defining that as 'happiness', and then
defining happiness in terms of the 'fulfilment of human capacities',
or if we find ourselves talking about the proper form of political
organization, and defining that in terms of 'consent', and consent
in terms of the 'will of the majority' as reflected in the ballot, all as
though those terms had meanings that were either self-evident or
could be stipulated, and as though we occupied a platform somehow above history and culture from which we could speak universal truths on such subjects, the experience of reading Plato should
3 For further discussion see my When Words Lose Their Meaning:
Constitutions and Reconstitutions of Language, Character, and Community
(Chicago, 1984), 95-8. For a fine article on reading Plato as a general matter, see
Hayden Ausland, 'On Reading Plato Mimetically' (1997) 118 American Journal of
Philology 371.
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make us pause, and ask how what we are saying might be located
in one of his dialogues: poised against what counter-formulations;
subject to what dissolutions, as the terms we use are shown not to
bear the weight we want to give them; rendered to what degree
incomplete or empty, as other related questions are raised to
which we have no way of speaking; and so forth.
It is thus one of the monumental achievements of Plato simultaneously to engage in the impulse to systematize and to subject that
impulse to criticism.

Law
What bearing if any does this understanding of Platonic philosophy have upon the reading and writing of the law? At first it
may seem none at all: the whole point of written laws in our
system is that they be clear and publicly available; only then, after
all, can the citizen who is subject to them conform his or her
conduct to their requirements, and only then can the official who
interprets and applies them be subject to the constraint we think
of as government under law. Uncertainty of law is a recipe for
official corruption, for the denial of the fundamental principle of
notice, and for violation of the ideal that like cases are to be
treated alike. We therefore demand that the law be clear, in
America making a constitutional principle of it. We in fact want
the law to do just what Socrates complains that writing does,
namely to say the same thing always. We do not want law to be
dialectical or conversational; we want clarity, fair notice, obedience, equal treatment.
READING LAW

But all this is far easier to say in general terms than it is to work
out in practice, as any look at a statute book or constitution or a
set of judicial cases will show. The main provisions of the first
amendment to the American Constitution, for example, are on the
surface plain enough: 'Congress shall make no law respecting the
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof;
or abridging freedom of speech, or of the press.' When we read
this we understand in a general way the values that the framers are
articulating, and we know that they want to be read as meaning

Writing and Reading in Philosophy, Law, and Poetry

9

business. But when we come to the application of such a standard,
serious problems emerge: is it an establishment of religion, for
example, for a legislature to begin its sessions with prayers led by
a chaplain paid by tax dollars? For the armed services to employ
chaplains? For a state to exempt religious organizations from its
tax laws? For a city to have a Christmas display that includes a
nativity scene?
Deciding those questions is not merely a matter of looking at
the words and seeing what they mean, for different people will
have different readings of the same language-different, reasoned,
and decent readings. The question the law faces, here as elsewhere, is what to do about the fact that we do reasonably differ,
including on the most important matters, and that there is no
obviously right way to resolve our differences.
This means that the ideal of clear language applied the same
way every time is simply out of reach. In the law the meaning of
the language in which authoritative directions are given is itself
always in question. Much in the same way that Plato sees that the
central terms of his language are uncertain in meaning and call for
new definition, the lawyer comes to see that the same is true of the
central terms in her discourse: terms such as 'religion' and 'speech'
and 'establishment' and 'free exercise' in the first amendment, for
example. The lawyer should not simply use her language as a
given, then, but see it as the proper subject of critical attention
and transformation.
Likewise, the lawyer should know what Plato reveals, that
there is no such thing as purely neutral, unsituated, abstract, or
disinterested thought or speech: no way, except in the heavenly
life Plato imagines to precede and follow our earthly one, in which
one can see beauty and truth and justice for what they are,
unchanging and eternal essences. Rather, every effort at thought
and expression is located in an historical moment and a particular
set of social relations, and these circumstances affect the meaning
of what is said. This is true of the Phaedrus itself, which is a
conversation between Socrates and Phaedrus; and true of the
lawyer who always thinks and speaks as the representative of a
particular client-the citizen who wants the nativity scene
removed for example, or the city that wants it to remain-or, if he
is a judge, as one trying to resolve the particular dispute before
him. For both lawyer and judge, the materials of meaning with
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which they work are to a large degree given them by others, in the
constitutions, statutes, regulations, contracts, judicial opinions,
and other texts that speak to the particular event. This material
will not and should not say the same thing always; it will in fact
yield different meanings to different minds in different situations,
differences that themselves become the topic of thought and argument.
For the lawyer, as for Plato, every discovery, every conclusion,
is provisional, open to question and perhaps to repudiation in a
later conversation-think of Socrates, who in the Phaedrus made
one speech against love, another one in praise of it, and then
changed the subject entirely. And it is common for a Platonic
dialogue to end with Socrates in a kind of perplexity, or if not
that, by reaching a conclusion that is still, in the terms established
in the dialogue itself, open to doubt. 4 Likewise each performance
in the law is the best we can do at the time, but it is always open
to revision: by appeal, by distinction, by overruling, by amendment.
The life of the law, like the life of philosophy, lies then in the
activity by which a problem is defined and approached, not in any
solution to it. This activity is what we learn and what we teach.
The part of this activity that we call 'reading' has much of the
character of a conversation with the ruling texts of the law, and
'writing' takes the form of conversation too, between judge and
lawyer, among lawyers, between lawyer and client, and so on.
Let me give you an example of what I mean, in the form of a
much simplified version of a real case, Lee v. Weisman. 5 The question is whether it is an improper establishment of religion for a
public high school to invite a local pastor or rabbi to give a prayer
as part of the graduation exercises. We can assume that the prayer
in question is as non-sectarian and vague as they usually are,
perhaps as simple as this: 'God of the Free, Hope of the Brave, for
the legacy and liberty and destiny of America we thank you. May
these young people fulfill their own hopes and those of their
parents and teachers. Amen.' Does this practice violate the
Constitution? My guess is that you are likely to have one of two
quick reactions, either 'Yes, of course, obviously it does: this
4

5

See, for example, Protagoras and Crito.
505 us 577 (1992).
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plainly violates the separation of church and state', or 'No, obviously not: we have had graduation prayers forever, and nothing
could be more innocuous than such a thing.'
Notice that the language of the first amendment prohibiting the
passage of any law 'respecting the establishment of religion',
however plain it may be to those on each side of the dispute, does
nothing to resolve the difference between them. It sits there, as
Plato says, reiterating itself and unable to respond to the questions
we have of it. But in the law we have more than the amendment:
we have the cases decided under it, and these complicate the question by providing two somewhat inconsistent lines of authority.
First, the Supreme Court has decided a series of cases, beginning with Engel v. Vitale in 1962, that prohibited the use of
prayers as part of the public school curriculum. Later cases have
similarly struck down Bible readings in school, recitations of the
Lord's Prayer, moments of silence meant as moments of prayer,
and the like. 6 These cases would support the conclusion that the
graduation prayer is invalid.
But there is a contrary line of authority, partly judicial, partly
rooted in the practice of other branches: Congress begins its
sessions with a prayer made by a chaplain paid with public funds;
there are chaplains in the military; high national officers are sworn
in on the Christian Bible; the President often includes a prayer as
part of his inaugural address; the Thanksgiving Proclamation is
typically in the form of a prayer, at least in part; and, most
recently, the Court held that the Nebraska legislature does not
violate the amendment by beginning its sessions with prayers
made by chaplains paid with state funds, even though some of
these prayers are highly sectarian in content.7 In the same vein,
within recent years the Court approved the inclusion of a nativity
scene in a municipal Christmas display. These precedents would
support the validity of the graduation prayer.
So what is the Court in the graduation prayer case to do?
Distinctions can be drawn, focusing for example on the degree of
compulsion present in school prayers, or the impressionable age of
the children in those cases; similarly, one can try to work out
6 See Engel v. Vitale, 370 US 421 (1962); School District v. Schempp, 374 US
203 (1963); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 US 38 (1985).
7
Marsh v. Chambers, 463 US 783 (1983).
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'tests' of various sorts for the resolution of this and similar cases. I
do not want here to pursue the various lines of argument in detail
but only to make the rather simple point that the task of the
lawyer, as he reads the amendment in the context of the cases
briefly outlined above, and in the context too of the particular
facts of the case, is a form of conversation, with a set of texts none
of which will say the same thing always. The language of the
amendment stimulates a conversation with its various contexts in
which it says not one but many different things, among which
choices have to be made. In fact, the law does not so much 'say
things' as create the conditions for a complex process of thought
and conversation, highly dialogic in character; it is this process of
thought that we learn, and teach, and practise as lawyers; this
process is, in an important sense, the law itself.
WRITING THE LAW

To think now about the problem of writing from the perspective
of the writer of laws-whether they take the form of statutes,
regulations, contracts or opinions-it should be plain that one
cannot proceed simply by saying what one means clearly and
plainly. This is partly a matter of the inherent vagueness of
language in certain contexts. Think, for example, of the definition
of crime. This requires an element of 'intention' or 'wrongfulness'-for we all surely would distinguish for purposes of criminal
punishment between accidental and deliberate injury of anotherbut no one can specify states of mind with clarity and precision.
Sentencing and custody disputes are similar cases: one simply
cannot articulate rules that wholly capture the considerations that
one thinks ought to influence the judgment in a particular case.
But the difficulty is not confined to cases where the law is
forced to use uncertain terms. The larger point rather is that the
way legal texts are used in our system-placed now in this factual
context, now another, placed now in this composition of other
texts, now another-gives all legal texts a kind of inherent uncertainty, which in turn gives rise to the necessity for the kind of legal
thought I have described. Legal texts do not and cannot say the
same thing always, and it is unrealistic in the extreme for the
writer to hope they can.
How then is one to think of the process of writing law, or to
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teach it, if not as the communication of commands in clear and
direct language? The heart of it I think is this: the lawmaker
should recognize that the application of his text depends on the
action and judgment of others. It is thus a social and cooperative
activity, and part of the lawmaker's task and opportunity is the
management of the social relations through which his statute (or
other text) will work. He is engaged in a conversation with his
audience and should try to speak to them about the task which he
has given them in some way other than by simply reiterating his
commands. He should thus write a text that does not simply say
the same thing always, but invites and responds to questions; a
text that has some of the quality of a dialogic partner.
The writing task is made all the more difficult when one realizes that there is not one audience for legislative and legal texts
but multiple audiences, ranging from citizens to jurors to lawyers
and judges. In each case the legislator must try to attune himself to
the situation of his audience, understanding the context against
which they will read this gesture, and do his best to produce a text
that will speak well to them all. An impossible but necessary task.
How this might be done, in particular cases or more generally,
is the topic of another talk, or of a course. 8 For present purposes
it is enough to see that this kind of writing is not mechanistic,
dull, or easy, but hard, complex, a full challenge to the mind.
Thus the best writing in the law and in philosophy alike does
not, as one might first think, strive to say the same things always,
but offers the reader an experience like that of conversation: it
stimulates questions, and responds to them; these responses invite
further questions, and lead the reader to a deepened understanding bounded by uncertainty. It is not in what Socrates 'says' or
what Phaedrus 'says' that we are to find the philosophy of Plato,
but in what the dialogue as a whole offers its reader, the experience of our engagement with it. Likewise it is not in what the
Constitution-or a statute, or a judicial opinion-'says' that we
find the law, but in the activity of reading and writing that these
texts simultaneously stimulate and reward.
The experience of the law can thus be seen to reinforce the
complex point of Plato's passage on writing, especially when it is
coupled with his own performance as a writer. He tells us that we
8
It is the subject of my The Legal Imagination: Studies in the Nature of Legal
Thought and Expression (Boston, 1973; Chicago, 1986).
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should not strive for writing that simply states its position in plain
words and stops, for such a thing is neither desirable nor possible.
Words do not carry meanings like freight cars and cannot be made
to do so; instead, we should understand that every act of language
is a performance, a gesture against a background of other
gestures, and that it asks to be understood as such by both speaker
and audience, by both writer and reader. Every performance is by
a situated speaker to a situated audience, and its conclusions must
always be provisional. No final and universal statements of truth
are possible for us here on earth but only, as Plato says, in the
heavens, where we can see truth and beauty and justice directlyan image the whole point of which is to distinguish it from the
conditions on which we live.
Poetry
Such are some connections between writing-and reading-in
philosophy and in law. How about the third form, poetry?
My thought here is that the sense of writing worked out above,
as an activity of mind-as an engagement with the nature of
language and the limits of human understanding that cannot
resolve itself into propositions assumed to be stable, but must
renew itself, again and again, whenever we speak or write-is an
essentially literary or poetic one. It might help, then, to work
through a poetic example, both as a way of making clearer what I
mean to say about philosophy and law, and as a way of suggesting
a resource to which as lawyers and philosophers we might turn to
learn more fully about the nature of the activity in which we are
engaged when we write.
For it is much easier to see that a poem or a novel does not simply
carry a message than it is to read a legal or philosophic text in such a
manner; much easier to see of the literary text that much of its meaning lies in its tones of voice and their transformations, its ways of
imagining the world and the speaker within it, its definition and
management of relations between speaker and audience, its
metaphors and images, its ways of meeting and upsetting expectations as to form, and so on. Literary texts are more obviously
dramatic texts, explicit performances with language and with social
relations, and to learn to read them may help us be more alert to
what might be called the literary aspects of apparently non-literary
texts. In particular, poetic texts are commonly founded on a tension,
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or a contradiction, between different ways of thinking or feeling or
acting or imagining the world, which they may not resolve at all, or
only partly. The truth that such a text asserts is thus not reducible to
one position, one voice, one way of thinking, but lies in the fact that
both opposing elements have weight and validity.
As an example I have deliberately chosen a poem that may not
look or sound much like a poem at all, and one that in fact may
seem reducible to a message. It is William Carlos Williams's poem
about taking the plums from the icebox, 9 which reads this way:
THIS JS JUST TO SAY

I have eaten
the plums
that were in
the icebox
and which
you were probably
saving
for breakfast
Forgive me
they were delicious
so sweet
and so cold

When you first read this poem, or hear it read aloud, I think you
are likely to have one or two rather strong reactions (just as was
the case with the graduation prayer case): either that this is a
beautiful poem, special in some as yet unknown way, or that it is
trivial and empty. In my own experience this was true of a group
of friends, all good readers, who divided in exactly that way and
engaged in heated dispute over the question that divided them.
On the negative side, it seems true that the poem does not have
the kind of dramatic and intense and clearly-shaped imagery -of a
poem, like Wallace Steven, 'Thirteen Ways of Looking at a
Blackbird', lO which begins this way:
9 'This is just to say' in The Collected Poems of William Carlos Williams (A.
Walton Litz and Christopher MacGowan (eds.), New York, 1986), 372. [William
Carlos Williams, 'This is Just to Say' from Collected Poems: 1909-1939, Volume 1,
copyright© 1938 by New Directions Publishing Corp., reprinted by permission of
the fcublishers, Carcanet Press Ltd. and New Directions Publishing Corporation.]
0 'Thirteen Ways of Looking at a Blackbird' in The Collected Poems of
Wallace Stevens (New York, 1971), 92.
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Among twenty snowy mountains
The only moving thing
Was the eye of the blackbird.

By comparison, the language 'and which you were probably
saving for breakfast' seems cluttered and awkward and utterly
ordinary, devoid of visual force. In addition, those who take the
negative view might add that this is a poem that is indeed
reducible to a mere proposition: I have eaten your plums, and
apologize. That is all there is to it.
But is that so? To test that we might ask what, if anything, the
poem does that such a message does not. Here imagine that you
are the poet's spouse-or perhaps room-mate or partner or hostand that you found this note on the icebox door: 'I ate your
plums; sorry about that.' How would that be different from this
poem?
Part of it is formal. You will probably not have noticed this
when you read the poem, but, as one of my friends observed in the
disputation referred to, there are patterns of sound that run
through the poem, all leading up to a strong emphasis on the last
line, 'so sweet and so cold'. 'Sweet' for example picks up the end
rhymes of 'eaten', 'probably', and 'me'; 'and so cold' picks up the
d and/ from 'delicious', the I from 'plums', the k sound from the
last line of each of the other stanzas, and, most of all, the enormously strong open o, which we have seen foreshadowed in
weaker form in 'forgive' and 'icebox' and 'probably'. As my friend
put it, these sounds 'have been laid out, given prominence, and
anticipated, all as carefully as a key and scale in music' .11
But even if you assume that we could go on at length in this
vein, establishing the formal complexity and coherence of what
seems at first a purely ordinary statement, there remains the question to what end this formal composition exists. It could still be at
bottom an empty expression, however mathematically or musically complex its organization of sounds. As the recipient of such
an apology you might feel that it was ingenious, reflecting a lot of
skill and effort, but still not very different in the end from 'sorry
about that'.
This brings us to the heart of the poem, which is the definition
11

help.

The friend referred to is my colleague A. L. Becker, whom I thank for his
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of feelings and social relations achieved in its tones of voice. Take,
to begin with, the phrase, 'I have eaten', which stands as its own
line at the very beginning of the poem. It is hard for anyone
educated in the Western tradition not to hear behind this simple
phrase echoes of the Garden of Eden: 'And hast thou eaten of the
tree whereof I commanded that thou shouldst not eat?' This allusion is reinforced by the later isolation of the word 'saving' in a
single line, and by the force of the phrase, again in a single line,
'Forgive me'.
What does the speaker do with this allusion? It could work in
ways that are heavy-handed, portentous, mechanistic; but in fact it
is quite delicate, precise, at once amusing and touching. See how it
plays against the self-depreciating title-'This is just to say'-to
create a real tension, the subject of which is the poem itself: is this
poem a trivial, minor, quotidian gesture, or is it serious, even too
serious?
The biblical reference is reinforced by the fact that what is
eaten here turns out to be a fruit; but at the same time it is made
less heavy-handed or merely allegorical by the fact that the fruit
here is not the apple of tradition but a plum-far more delicious
and tempting, and far more ordinary at least than that traditional
fruit, in part because it is located, we learn, in the 'icebox'.
Yet, despite the clarity of these allusions, a voice within us
wants to say that this simply cannot be an instance of the Fall; it is
far too quotidian or trivial. To think of this event in such a grand
way is ludicrous. But eating an apple is trivial and quotidian too;
and in the second stanza the poem makes plain that the eating of
the plums was an act with real moral significance, not simply as a
matter of doctrine or theology, but as a matter of actual human
relations, for they were not his but someone else's, and he did not
eat just one but all of them. Once more we face the peculiar
tension that it is the characteristic of this poem to stimulate: we
are bound to feel, in part, that this is simply not a big deal,
perhaps once more finding ourselves using the word 'trivial'; but it
is not an entirely small thing either, and if a marriage or other
relation were regularly marked by such transgressions it would be
full of difficulty. (Just imagine what Jane Austen would make it
mean.) And if the Fall means anything it will show up in the
smallest details of life.
The speaker has in fact wronged his wife (let us assume), on
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however small a scale and no matter how understandable the
temptation; what does he do about this fact? He acknowledges
that the plums were themselves not trivial, but important to her;
he also shows, especially in the 'probably', that he knows her, her
tastes and values. This at once makes his offence the more serious
and the poem a more adequate recompense, for this is not a
stereotyped apology, any man to any woman, but one addressed
to her. He shows that he knows her.
His acknowledgement is the initial point of the note itself'This is just to say'. But why 'just'? He is here minimizing both the
expression and the wrong that gave rise to it; this is part of what
leads some readers to take the poem as trivial. But he does not
stop with the sentence begun in the title, and the sentiments upon
which that sentence was based, but comes to see the need to go
on, to take another step. And this is far from a small one: 'Forgive
me'.
This is still not the end. Now he reaffirms the original act, at
least in part, by making the temptation seem practically irresistible, indeed by trying to elicit his reader's imaginative sympathy, even complicity, to confirm what he has done. This is the
significance of what we noticed earlier, the great emphasis and
intensity given to 'so sweet and so cold'.
The speaker thus begins with a gesture designed to trivialize
both what he has done and his present expression; but he finds he
cannot do this; he recognizes that the wrong, however small, was
real-she was saving the plums for breakfast. He then asks for
forgiveness, at first on the basis of his repentance; but he discovers
that this too will not work, for the repentance is not and cannot
be entirely sincere; he is still in the temptation and cannot deny it.
Then he asks for forgiveness, implicitly, on quite a different
ground, that it is his nature-and ours too: we confirm it in our
response to the last line-to yield to such temptations.
The poem ends with real sweetness, in his confidence that he
will be forgiven. This is an enactment of trust, part of what makes
it a love poem. (The other part is his knowledge of her.) But it also
ends with a real coldness, in the inescapably fallen nature of his
being and ours. Yet it is this coldness that makes the sweetness
possible: the sweetness is the blessing that he knows that with all
his faults, he loves and is loved after all.
To return now to the question whether this really is a poem, or
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really any good: you can see that I think that the answer to both
questions is yes. On the other hand, the negative judgments I
describe are not without basis, for the poem itself is perpetually
creating a tension between the view that it, and the events it
speaks of, are crucial, important, aspects of eternal human truth,
and the view that it is all too trivial, ordinary, quotidian to count
for much. Both parts, the claim of meaning and the self-depreciation are parts of the poem, and important parts: indeed this is the
tension at the centre of the piece.
In this the poem captures a tension present in our own everyday life including as lawyers: are the details of our lives merely
quotidian and trivial? Or do they make up a moral and aesthetic
drama of real importance? This is a question to which law itself
speaks. The truth that grandeur can be found in the ordinary, the
great in the small, is in this poem placed against the truth that the
ordinary is truly ordinary; what the poem represents is thus a
crucial and unresolvable uncertainty at the heart of human life. It
holds itself out as a response to be imitated, finding a kind of
redemption in the tones of voice with which it speaks, at once serious and comic, overstated and understated, claiming and disowning meaning, all in a gesture of love and trust.
Let me briefly make it plain that the question at the heart of
this poem is also at the heart of the law. Something happens in the
client's life, say an unwanted pregnancy, or an arrest for drunkenness, or a restriction in the use of his land: does this mean
anything, does it matter? These are the questions for the lawyer,
whose task it is to see that it does matter and to give it meaning in
the language of the law. We live our lives on the faith that this can
be done, that law can convert the raw material of human experience-the pain, the fury, the loss-into the material of meaning,
and in such a way as to permit or invite or enable meaningful
action in response. Philosophy too, at least as Plato does it, lives
out these questions: does it matter that Phaedrus is infatuated with
the rhetoric of Lysias? What does it mean?
Williams's poem can be taken as an instance of a text that does
not say the same thing always, but offers its reader a drama, an
experience of discovery, that has many of the qualities of a
conversation. I have offered one version of this poem, but it is
only one version and surely not complete; what is more, I respect
the views of my friends who read and judge it very differently.
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This poem is at heart the occasion for an activity of thought and
reflection and argument, in principle not reducible to an outcome,
which it stimulates and rewards. Its value is the value of that
activity. In this it is like the best of philosophy and the best of law.
In all three fields it is a mistake-a denial of life-to try to
write a text that will say the same thing always, or to read a wellwritten text as if that were the writer's goal. Philosopher, lawyer,
poet-all three do their real work in the conversations they establish with their reader, or among their readers. This is where the
life and meaning are. There is a side of each of us that wants to
forget this, and to live in a simpler world of statements that are
true or false, rules that are just or unjust, poems that are beautiful
or ordinary, denying our responsibility to face the uncertainties
and tensions with which even the best work-especially the best
work-presents us. But this will not do: the best work in each
field teaches us otherwise; and in each field we are constantly in
need of the education offered by the others.

